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A lot has been written about corruption, especially regarding the corruption in post-
communist countries, and Slovenia is not an exception. The forms of corruption are similar 
to those in other countries in transition, the reasons for corruption in Slovenia well known 
and the typology well processed. Most of the corruption in Slovenia occurs in the area 
where public and private spheres come together, with strong networks remaining, and 
where also systemic corruption occurs. However, there has not been any progress in 
corruption fighting. Opinion surveys show that the perception of corruption is high (the 
personal experience with corruption proved very high during the conducted research), 
however, people are not very familiar with the it (all its forms and consequences) and 
therefore, in order to successfully fight corruption, actions should be taken in the form of 
education and in the sense of raising public awareness of the harmfulness of corruption. At 
the same time the political will is also lacking, which, however, in the fight against 
corruption has not been shown by any government so far. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many scientific and professional articles on corruption 
in transition countries have been published. Especially 
the countries that were created by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union are a real laboratory for the investigation 
of corruption. And how is the corruption in Slovenia 
different from the corruption in other transition 
countries? Actually, only in a few things. The corruption 
in Slovenia is more sophisticated, more obscure and less 
crude than in some of the other post-communist 
countries, there is less use of force, threats and links to 
organized crime (except regarding the organized 
economic crime). However, negative impacts are similar 
or identical (only the extent of these impacts can be 
                                                      
1 Old boys – a network of individuals, who have been cooperating with each 
other in the business, friendship and political sphere for a long time, while most 
of the connections originate from the time of the previous regime (ex-
Yugoslavia) 
 
2 Originates from the word UDBA, which means ‘state security 
administration’. The administration was later replaced with SDV – ‘state 
called into question). 
The state administration still exhibits the remains of the 
old administration, loyal to the previous regime or the 
previous leaders, as well as the remains of the old 
socialist structure in the judiciary and other important 
services and institutions that impact the functioning of 
the state (the police, the secret services). Old 
commitments and friendships still remain, old economic 
links and connections to old politics and economy (the 
so-called Old Boys1) as well as links, based on the 
remnants of the Communist Party and of former 
intelligence and security services (the so-called UDBA-
mafia2), which do not select resources for their 
operations and use a number of methods that are similar 
to those in other socialist countries (compromise, 
security service’, however, the term UDBA remained in use. The UDBA mafia 
therefore means the still connected ex-members of the state security 
administration, who are still influential in all sectors of the society (from 
economy to health care and culture). 
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extortion, covert coercion, media influence, etc.). In 
Russia, a similar network of people who remained 
closely connected and assist each other whenever 
necessary consisted of people who were in high 
positions in Komsomol (Dobovšek, Mimič, 2005, p. 39). 
If both branches functioned separately, the influence of 
corruption would be easier to manage, however, the 
great danger for both the democracy as well as the 
economy is that both branches are connected. The 
mentioned is due to the old economic connections, the 
remains of the old administration, as well as the judiciary 
and the remnants of the so called UDBA-mafia which 
are interconnected and operate in a coordinated manner. 
The links remained also because the President of the 
Communist Party of Slovenia had the highest function 
in the republic, and was also superior to the national 
executive council (the government of the republic of 
Slovenia) and directly superior to the national security 
intelligence service (SDV) (the state security service - 
the communist police), while the political top had 
complete control over the appointment of directors or 
administrations in (state) enterprises (only vetted staff, 
according to the political line). During the transition 
from socialism to democracy in 1991, the president of 
the new independent Slovenia became the last president 
of the League of Communists of Slovenia. As lustration 
was not performed, the connections and networks 
remained more or less practically.  
 
Through the transition, the so-called continuity forces 
acquired the political, economic power, and still 
dominate the majority of the leading media, part of the 
state administration and the judiciary. At the same time, 
the stagnant and relatively low-paid bureaucratic 
apparatus, high regulation and limitations applying to 
the economic activities and a still great state’s share in 
large and important companies lead to corruption in 
itself. A special area is also public health, where millions 
are getting lost through non-transparent and often 
falsified public procurement (in this area the networks 
and the interests of old continuity structures already 
severely intertwine with the emergence of new actors), 
while many doctors try to earn money on the side. The 
inventory transformation was led by gradualism, instead 
of changing rapidly, and all too many important 
companies became only a money bucket for supplying 
various consultants, suppliers and politicians of both 
poles. 
 
2. Causes and Typology of Corruption  
 
The old players are always joined by new ones, those 
who also want their share or participation in the 
distribution of state money. However, these networks or 
individuals strive for money much than the ideology. 
 
According to Dimc (2009, p.66), the impact of informal 
networks is high in all areas; the economy, politics, state 
institutions, health, media, etc. these areas are, due to the 
small size of the country, closely intertwined, which 
further stimulates or promotes the formation and growth 
of informal networks. Such policy of demanding 
something in return is present in all areas, from 
legislation making, financing of business, financing of 
elections, employment, etc.). In addition, Slovenian 
ethical and moral standards do not yet have a tradition, 
as opposed to the countries with long-standing 
democracy and are not yet fully built (there still exist the 
thought patterns from the times of socialism and social 
equality is still one of the greatest values, etc), which 
also applies to professional standards, and therefore the 
public officials sometimes do not decide according to 
professional and ethical standards, which would, 
depending on the job they occupy, be expected from 
them. 
 
Appendix to the Explanation of the Proposal of the Law 
on Preventing Conflicts of Interest and Restriction of 
Corruption (the first proceedings, EVA: 2003 -2011- 
0042) identifies similar causes for the development of 
corruption in Slovenia: 
• Economic and social causes: corruption in Slovenia is 
not existentially conditioned, and serves only to improve 
the material position of individuals; the old and new 
elites, by combining economic and political power, are 
establishing dominance in new conditions, which creates 
favourable conditions for the development of “state 
capture” and administrative corruption, the privatization 
of individual state functions progresses slowly, private 
companies are still too dependent on politics. 
• Legal causes: the still unfinished reform of the legal 
system, subject to frequent, also non-systematic and 
inconsistent changes, which, on one hand, cannot meet 
all the challenges of real life, and on the other do not 
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provide effective responses to detected socio-
pathological practices; large backlogs. 
• Institutional causes: public administration in Slovenia 
has not yet been depoliticised, employment and 
promotion are not based on purely meritocratic 
principles, clientelism and nepotism have developed, 
and above all the political favouritism, while the internal 
and external control mechanisms have not yet been 
sufficiently developed and effective (the risk of corrupt 
individuals is small or non-existent), the decision-
making is not yet transparent enough, the discretionary 
powers are too wide, the system of responsibility for 
wrong political and business decisions is not 
functioning, there is no coordinated approach to the 
prevention and suppression of corruption, the private 
sector almost does not deal with the dangers of 
corruption. 
• Cultural causes: the culture of exclusively state 
intervention still holds for mediation in the event of 
irregularities, and according to the opinion polls, the 
deciding politicians enjoy only a low level of people's 
confidence, the non-governmental sector has only begun 
to develop, the level of citizens' awareness of their and 
institutional rights and obligations is low, the level of 
anti-corruption sensitivity or awareness is growing 
slowly, the high ethical standards are rarely formulated, 
the useful ethical codes are more an exception than the 
rule, the role of the media in detecting and exposing 
corruption could be bigger. 
• External causes: free competition in the conditions of the 
global economy exposes the Slovenian companies to 
additional risks. The rapid and intense adaptation of the 
acquis while integrating into international integration 
could also have resulted in the unverified adoption of 
foreign regulations, doctrines and practices. 
 
From the analysis of the trends of corruption it is evident 
that (especially in the transition countries, including 
Slovenia) the most cases of corruption occur in areas 
where the state sphere and economy are intertwined, and 
where the most of money is made (Dobovšek, 2008, p. 
195), which is exactly the sphere that also includes 
public procurement. Public procurement appears in all 
corruption surveys in Slovenia as well as in Europe at 
the very top of the corruption risks (even the corruption 
                                                      
3 Public-private partnership – hereinafter PPP 
investigations most commonly deal with fraud in 
procurement) and, according to Peteh (2001, p. 25), the 
negative tradition continues from the former social 
property system, where the unwritten rule was that 
whenever a big investment (roads, bridges, etc.) was 
built, so was a smaller, private one (for the local or state 
important persons) or a “social” facility (for wider 
community). These statements are confirmed also by the 
study by Kurdija (2009), which he carried out for the 
Commission for the Prevention of Corruption of the 
Republic of Slovenia, where the respondents expressed 
the belief about the relatively high levels of corruption 
in public services, especially in public procurement. 
 
The next such big opportunity for corruption is the 
public-private partnership3. The public infrastructure 
and the public services play an important role in the 
modern society, and the state should be the one that 
provides this, and thus pursue the public interest of the 
society. The provision of such “goods” requires more 
and more investments, which (often) exceed the 
budgetary capacity of the state, and the state is trying to 
solve this problem of the deficit in the state budget by 
linking it to the economy. By concluding a public-
private partnership, the state transfers part of the 
financial burden to a private partner, thus enabling the 
implementation of projects that are in the public interest 
but could otherwise not be (most likely) implemented by 
the state itself. The latter is also the main reason why the 
state introduced the public-private partnership; to enable 
it and encourage private investments in projects that are 
in the interest of public. 
 
At first glance it seems that a public-private partnership 
presents a solution or rather the response to many 
financial problems of countries when it comes to 
providing public infrastructure, services and public 
good. However, at the same time such a partnership 
gives the public officials, office holders and political 
leaders the opportunity to “access” private funds. There 
is a great temptation to plan and implement the PPP 
project by placing in a privileged position a favoured 
individual or company, due to acquaintanceship or 
promised benefit. It is obvious that even although a 
public-private partnership is “offered” as a means of 
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reducing corruption, the process itself allows or provides 
a number of corrupt practices (Banovec, 2013). 
Although dissatisfied with the current state of affairs in 
the country, the Slovenians are still politically apathetic 
and of a rather pessimistic character, they stick to the “go 
with the flow” dogma, which means that they do not 
regard protests or uprisings as one of the solutions and 
are even not of the opinion that the early elections might 
improve the situation. This political apathy is also 
reflected in the creation of CDOs4 that would respond to 
the problems of inadequate political and socio-cultural 
governance in the country, while at the same time the 
strong influence of institutionalized religious 
communities on the public and policy making can be 
noticed. 
 
Comparisons of official data on poverty, income 
inequality, unemployment, etc. gathered in the annual 
reports of the Ombudsman, the Red Cross, Karitas, 
social assistance centres, etc., are also interesting. There 
is a noticeable gap between the official statistics on one 
hand and those who directly deal with people's problems 
on the other, which raises doubt about the official data. 
Due to the reduced access to a better living standard 
(social security is becoming payable), some are reducing 
their ethical standards (by using social networks and 
connections to obtain social security, avoid paying taxes, 
moonlight, abuse the position, etc.) in order to achieve a 
higher level. Nevertheless, the Slovenes appreciate 
honesty and fairness, while integrity is becoming an 
increasingly recognizable value, one that is also clearly 
demanded from the power holders (one of the effective 
slogans for winning the election is precisely the 
reference to morality, ethics and transparency). Political 
apathy and mistrust of citizens in the rule of law reflect 
the low support to the government, political parties and 
the current political activity in general. Corruption is 
perceived as a major problem, one that could be reduced 
through the Commission for the Prevention of 
Corruption, the media and partly the law enforcement 
agencies (Habič et. all, 2012, p. 9). 
 
                                                      
4 CSO - Civil society organization 
5 Corruption of white collars is the corruption of highly qualified 
officials, who are the carriers of specific powers, and highly 
trained professionals, which are: ministers, state secretaries, 
According to the different types of corruption, the 
Commission for the Prevention of Corruption assessed 
the corruption in Slovenia as follows (KPK, 2010, page 
8): 
• Slovenia is a country with a relatively low level of 
administrative corruption when compared to other (post) 
transition countries in the wider Europe (member of the 
Council of the European Union); even in comparison 
with some older EU members (for example, Italy, 
Greece); 
• With regard to white collar corruption5, certain 
indicators show that Slovenia is in a better position than 
other (post) transition countries and comparable to some 
of the old EU member states (the Mediterranean basin). 
This form of corruption is closely linked to the cases of 
economic and public finance crime that Slovenia has 
been facing in the recent years. 
• The past and current economic and financial crisis in 
Slovenia revealed the long-standing development of 
systemic / institutional corruption. 
 
However, in 2014, after the assessment of the situation, 
the CPC became more critical of the corruption of white 
collars. According to the assessment of the commission, 
the corruption of white collars is strongly present in 
Slovenia, while there is less administrative corruption, 
although the Commission receives a lot of complaints 
about suspected irregularities in administrative 
procedures. According to the commission, the systemic 
corruption is especially important, as it often goes hand 
in hand with the defective legislation, thus providing a 
number of opportunities for individuals or groups to 
place their own interests before the interests of the 
community or the state (KPK, 2014, p. 3). 
 
Similarly, to the findings of the CPC, the World Bank 
Institute's survey carried out in 2004 (Finance, 2006) 
found that in Slovenia there are fewer problems with 
illegal corruption than with legal or lawful corruption (a 
common denominator of legal corruption around the 
world, that is the phenomenon of exploitation of 
informal powers and political ties for one’s own benefit, 
directors of directorates, senior ministry officials, members of 
parliament, directors of public, public-private and private 
companies, as well as the experts on law and operation of the 
state apparatus. 
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is the political irresponsibility). One of the co-authors of 
the study (Pedro Vincente) also added that legal 
corruption is a phenomenon when the media in the 
country usually do not have independent or good control 
of the work of politics; they also do not have control of 
lobbying and other forms of informal influence that lead 
to the exchange of services between the state, companies 
and individuals. The anti-corruption laws do not apply 
to these softer forms of corruption. 
 
In his doctoral dissertation, Škrbec (2013, p.107) 
investigated also the causes and motives for the 
occurrence of corruption in Slovenia and found the four 
most common ones. The first or most common cause and 
motive for corruption is the improvement of the 
economic status (thus greed). The second most common 
cause are past habits6, since the people in ex-Yugoslavia 
looked for ways to circumvent the system and the rules 
of the game. The third cause of corruption is of a 
systemic nature, as the system itself has an impact on the 
increase of corruption, while the fourth most frequent 
cause is the smallness of Slovenia and the functioning of 
the bonds and acquaintanceships, which makes the 
regulation of things in Slovenia specific; the country 
being so small that everybody knows everybody makes 
it easier to create informal networks and, which are, 
therefore, also easier to conceal. People thus meet 
through informal networks and together search for ways 
to meet their own interests. He also states (p. 120) that 
the Slovenes are selfish creatures and that, when 
something is good for them, they respect it, but 
otherwise they try to find a bypass of such restrictions or 
things that do not suit them. The legal culture in Slovenia 
is at a level where people respect the law only when they 
have a personal benefit from it. Those who strictly 
observe the law in Slovenia are exemptions rather than 
the rule and are in public sometimes even stigmatized as 
“idiots, fools” or something similar. 
 
Grodeland (2005) in his study similarly finds that the 
majority of respondents in Slovenia believe that the 
Slovenes do not respect the rule of law and that the 
                                                      
6 Partially already after World War I, and even more so after the Second World 
War, the so-called balkanization of Slovenia occured, when after the 
confrontation with the pre-war economic and political elite, the authority and 
the leading role in the country were taken over by the former NOB fighters, 
who and often introduced the “Balkan mentality” in the political as well as the 
wider social space. Slovenia, as the most economically developed republic, 
search for holes in the law is a national sport. According 
to Grodeland, the Slovenes in general consider that it is 
necessary to be inventive, and they respect only the part 
of the laws that benefits them. According to the 
respondents, the non-observance of laws originates 
mainly from the communist past. 
 
As previously mentioned, major problems and a major 
source of corruption in Slovenia are also informal 
networks, both old, stemming from socialism and new 
ones, created only to gain benefits, while there is also the 
interweaving of both. The existence of the networks and 
the connection of these with corruption was confirmed 
by the survey of 2003 - 2004 (Dobovšek in Dimc, 2007, 
p.76), as well as by the research of the Norwegian 
Institute for Urban and Regional Research (Grodeland, 
2005). There are, however, quite a few studies or studies 
of corruption (as well as the networks that allow it), 
among which I would like to mention also Tonin (2009), 
who studied corruption at the level of municipalities, in 
particular the operation of mayors and their influence: 
the mayors have become all-powerful “local sheriffs” 
that are involved in all disputes of social life, and have 
also become the creators of local informal networks, 
which enable them to achieve their goals, both public 
and private (p. 4). The informal network thus ensures 
that even those who in various public tenders only lend 
their name and who, by fixing an excessive price, make 
it possible to select a specific provider, get their share. 
The network between the mayor and the local economic 
operators intertwines into a strong interdependence, 
where the exit from the network is almost impossible 
and can mean the loss of position, the loss of work, and, 
ultimately, the prosecution of those involved (p.8). 
 
I would also point out the study of the effects of 
corruption on business between economic operators, the 
results of which are indicative of how poorly people in 
leading positions prepare for business cooperation. It is 
true that in business transactions everything is directed 
to the realization of the transaction within a certain 
period of time, so that no additional costs are incurred, 
similarly experienced a great arrival of workers from the south of Yugoslavia, 
which further caused the change in mentality of both workers and officials. The 
term “rule of law” was not taken seriously (Heršak in Brioschi, 2003, p.240), 
since Tito himself stated that judges should not adhere to the law “like blind 
person clinging to a lamp post”.  
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and that with each business transaction, the goal due to 
which this transaction was concluded is also achieved. 
In all cases, it is also expected from the manager that the 
business will conclude with profit or increase liquidity. 
All of this is becoming the fundamental goal of each 
director, who often completely forget all ethical 
standards, consequently become victims of the desire to 
achieve the goal regardless of the risk (Partljič, 2012, p. 
67). It is also sad that the research by Ernst & Young 
consulting firm, published in Die Welt (2013), reveals 
that Slovenia is a notorious record holder in Europe, as 
the share of managers for whom bribery is common is 
96 per cent. Slovenia is followed by Croatia with 90 per 
cent and Ukraine with 85 per cent (also a former 
communist state). 
 
3. Systemic Corruption 
 
Alongside individual types of corruption 
(administrative, corruption in public procurement, 
corruption in health care, etc.), the systemic corruption 
also presents a significant problem of corruption in 
Slovenia. According to researches carried out by 
international institutions, and the theories of various 
experts who have been closely involved in corruption 
and practice, known from various events around the 
world, the indicators that influence the development of 
systemic corruption, which is among the more 
widespread also in Slovenia, are as follows 
(Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, 2011): 
• the existence of economic monopolies, negotiations with 
cartels and limited competition, large national and local 
infrastructure projects, 
• little chance that corruption will be detected and 
properly sanctioned by supervisory institutions and law 
enforcement authorities, 
• the process of economic liberalization and privatization 
with the influence of politics, 
• lengthy court proceedings, 
• distrust of the political system and institutions of the rule 
of law, and the uncertainty of political and economic 
events in the country, 
• poor control over public procurement, 
• incomplete system of internal audits regarding the 
efficiency of public money, 
• weak control of supervisory authorities in the economy 
and low degree of ethics between the actors in the 
business performance, 
• politicization or non-transparent privatization of public 
media, especially media space, 
• inefficient and non-transparent financing of 
entrepreneurship by the financial institutions, 
• the influence of lobbies on the legislative process. 
Dobovšek and Škrbec (2012) similarly confirmed with 
their research, as they found that corruption in Slovenia 
affects the state's functioning, especially the doctrine of 
the rule of law, its functioning and the way people think 
or establish certain values. Most of the corrupt practices 
are done by those who should be examples of a correct 
and fair attitude towards matters of public interest in all 
areas of social relations and processes (officials and 
public office holders). 
 
4. Perception of Corruption 
In his article, Malnar (2011) notes that Slovenia is 
characterized by a significant gap between official 
statistical indicators of social inequality and their public 
opinion perceptions. Pursuing of minor inequalities 
means also a spontaneous rational strategy of providing 
one's own social “just in case” security. This is 
particularly likely in an environment characterized by 
the extremely low public confidence in politics on one 
hand, and at the same time extremely high expectations 
about the role of the state in ensuring the material well-
being on the other. This “paradox”, which is another 
highly interconnected unified element of political space 
in Slovenia, is probably the key to explaining the gap 
between the statistics and the public opinion. According 
to the data, the “a priori” demands of the public for the 
reduction of inequality are not motivated by the 
experience of social deprivation, but rather by the 
favourable material position of most households and the 
associated fear of losing the achieved prosperity, while 
small inequalities are understood as a condition or a 
support system of its continuity. Similarly goes for the 
large gap between the official statistics of corruption and 
the perception of corruption in the survey, and it could 
therefore be assumed, according to Malnar's findings, 
that the high perception of corruption generates fear of 
it (nothing to fear but fear itself).  
 
The fact is that there is a connection between the 
perception of corruption and the living standard. If we 
take into account that the mentality of Slovenes folds 
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also the tendency to revolt and “rebel” - especially if 
someone interferes with their acquired standard of 
living, which is derived from the psychological profile 
of Slovenes (Musek, 1997) - then it can be concluded 
that often, when detecting the first changes in indicators 
that show a decline in the standard (economic agents 
respond quickly and rationally to changes in the market), 
the corruption detection index also increases. The first 
such indicator of the fall in the living standard is the rise 
in the unemployment, while the second is the fall in the 
purchasing power. 
 
 The above graph shows that there are some correlations 
between the index of corruption perception, 
unemployment and purchasing power. Especially in 
2008, when unemployment was at the lowest, the 
corruption perception index was at the highest, or rather, 
with the decline in unemployment, the corruption 
detection index rose, and vice versa. After the beginning 
of the rise in unemployment, the corruption perception 
index began to fall (that is, when the unemployment is 
low, the corruption perception is also low and vice 
versa). The same findings were identified by other 
authors who have studied the impact of the living 
standard and social conditions on the perception of 
corruption (e.g. Melgar, Rossi and Smith, 2010). 
Similarly goes also for the graph that shows the 
relationship between the corruption perception index 
and the purchasing power (here, too, the curves, 
especially the tops and the bottoms, match). 
 
       Figure 1: Ratio between the index of corruption 
perception and unemployment 
 
       Source: Šumah and Mahič, 2015, p.25 
 
Figure 2: Ratio between the index of corruption perception 
and purchasing power 
 
       Source: Šumah and Mahič, 2015, p.25 
 
Both are in the survey statistically confirmed with the 
least square’s method (the p-value is low, indicating that 
there is a statistically significant link between 
unemployment and the corruption perception index, or 
the impact of unemployment on the change in the 
corruption index is statistically significant): 
 
             Corruption Perception Index = 6.96099 + (-
0.130923 x Unemployment) 
 
If unemployment increases by one percent 
(unemployment is given in %), the corruption perception 
index drops in average by 0.130923 percentage point 
(the perception of corruption increases). 
 
Similarly applies to the correlation between the 
corruption perception index and the purchasing power. 
Here also there is a statistically significant link between 
the change in the purchasing power and the change in 
the corruption perception index, or the impact of the 
change of the purchasing power on the change of the 
corruption index is statistically significant: 
 
Corruption Perception Index = 6.96099 + 1.06806 x 
Purchasing Power 
 
If purchasing power increases by one percent, the 
corruption perception index increases by 1.06806 
percentage point on average or the perception of 
corruption decreases (Šumah and Mahić, 2015). 
 
Undoubtedly, the increased perception is influenced also 
by the collectivism and the socialist ideology of 
“equality”, which were forced upon by the previous 
system, and which did not suit the personal structure and 
the tradition of the Slovenes. Of course, the system could 
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not force a substantial change of the personality profile, 
however, the profile was already affected by the 
transformation of the mentality of the people. The 
Slovenes still have difficulties to say goodbye to the 
forced mentality of egalitarianism without 
responsibility, which diminishes creativity, and so 
people often choose an easier way (also through 
corruption). Although the great changes liberated the 
Slovenes from two debts - they became independent and 
at the same time shook off the collectivism that was 
foreign to their culture - the habits and part of the 
“socialist folklore” still remain. 
 
The summary of the most important findings of the 
indirect measurement of corruption in Slovenia since 
2000 (Škrbec, 2009). If the main findings of the indirect 
measurement of corruption after 2000 are summarized, 
it can be seen that: 
• compared to the period before 2000, the period after 
2000 was enriched by researches, the share of them 
increased remarkably, the share of Slovenia's corruption 
surveys also increased by 100%, 
• 42% of respondents believe that corruption is a major 
problem in Slovenia, 
• mostly respondents believe that since the last elections 
(in 2004) things got worse as regards to the incidence of 
corruption, however, the most noticeable shift in the 
situation happened between December 2007 and 
February 2008, 
• the majority of respondents think that bribes in public 
services are accepted by “quite a few civil servants”, 
• if the answers “has somewhat increased” / “has 
increased significantly” are calculated, the sum 
represents approximately 62% of the respondents’ 
answers, 
• the greatest likelihood of an incidence of corruption, 
according to the personal opinion of the respondents, is 
in the health sector, 
• in all the assessed areas, the proportion of respondents 
who believe that corruption in this area is probable, far 
exceeds the proportion of those who had a real 
experience with the corruption in that area, 
• the inefficient prosecution and too low sanctions are the 
main cause of corruption, followed by a lack in 
legislation, 
• the majority of respondents actually experienced 
corruption in public procurement, in health care, in the 
conduct of police and inspectors, etc., 
• according to the respondents, the most important actors 
in the prevention of corruption are Commission for the 
Prevention of Corruption or the former Office for 
Prevention of Corruption, then the media, followed by 
the Police, the Office for Money Laundering Prevention, 
Inspectorates etc., 
• in the case of the indirect measurement, the influence on 
the formation of a subjective opinion on the prevalence 
and forms of corruption are largely caused by the media 
and then by personal experience, 
• one of the findings of the 2008 survey is that more than 
half of the respondents (55.4%) believe that the level of 
corruption in Slovenia will increase in the coming years, 
while a quarter (25.5%) is of the opposite opinion. 
14.9% of respondents think that corruption will remain 
the same. 
As part of the research for this article, a short survey of 
people's experiences with corruption was also made. The 
survey was conducted through social networks and e-
mails. It reached 1649 respondents. 360 surveys that 
were filled were appropriate for the analysis with the 
SPSS programme. A surprisingly high percentage of 
respondents have personal experiences with corruption 
(157 out of 359 respondents, or 43% of the respondents 
whose answer to the question whether they had had a 
personal experience with corruption was positive). 
Especially interesting, however, is the analysis of 
differences in experience with corruption by gender: 
 
 Gender Total 
Male Female 
Experience 
with 
corruption 
1 88 69 157 
2 82 120 202 
Total 170 189 359 
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a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5.  
The minimum expected count is 74.35. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
There are differences in the experience with corruption 
according to gender. Chi-square is 8.47, the statistical 
significance is 0.003. There are differences in the 
proportion of men who have experienced corruption, 
which still shows certain patriarchalism in an otherwise 
fairly equal Slovenian society. 
 
However, there is nevertheless a huge difference 
between the perception (i.e. indirect measurement) and 
the official records, which is best seen if a comparison is 
made between the official records available and the 
perception. If only official records were considered, it 
could easily be concluded that the corruption in Slovenia 
is, in fact, a small problem. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Corruption is indeed a multi-dimensional process. On 
one hand there is the provider of the benefits, on the 
other the recipient, while both are aware of the action 
that remains a secret. The third link in the chain is then 
everyone else; the injured parties. Although not every 
act of corruption is yet a criminal offense, it is unethical 
and harmful to the economic and political development 
of the society. The actors involved are usually those who 
have political, economic power and power of decision-
making (Integrity, 2013), and, as the philosopher Karl 
Popper wrote in his book Open Society and its enemies, 
the biggest problem is not who should direct, but how to 
control the one who directs, that is, how to organize the 
political and social institutions in order to prevent the 
weak and incompetent rulers from causing harm. 
However, as there is no general and unmistakable way 
to prevent the tyranny or the corruption of the influential 
people, the price of freedom is eternal alertness 
(Brioschi, 2003, p. 125). 
 
Slovenia (as well as other transition countries) is thus 
facing a hard nut of corruption to crack, if it wants to 
approach the success in the fight against corruption 
similar to some economically prosperous countries with 
a rich tradition of democracy. The European path begins 
with the legal order, political and social equality, and 
above all with the cosmopolitan cultural identity. After 
the acceptance of these values, a culture of mutual 
understanding and dialogue will also succeed. Until 
now, the post-socialist countries that have reconstructed 
their failed democracy (the so called “brake down 
countries”) after the fall of the Berlin Wall have not yet 
traversed from the (post)transition to transformational 
learning society. Slovenia, being one of the youngest and 
the smallest among them, has no transitional experience 
in this area (Novak, 2011). Therefore, in the fight against 
corruption, Slovenia must be inspired by older and more 
successful democracies, and the mentality of the people, 
not individuals changed, as it will only thus succeed in 
the fight against corruption. 
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It can also be argued that people often do not recognize 
corruption, since it seems to already be a part of 
everyday life, a kind of folklore (typical of countries in 
transition), and those who get rich due to it are not 
condemned, but admired: “He got around it!” Or, if 
Kant's findings (Kant in Jager, 2015) of 1764 (which are 
still very true today) are used, fraudulent cunning is 
expanding and slowly establishing as the rule or “the 
maxim of behaviour”. Those who are most cunning 
often climb to the highest positions, the mass media are 
putting them on a pedestal, they become role models to 
young people who are raised by their parents and the 
mass media brought up in the spirit of “delusional 
success”. Whoever does not follow this maxim because 
he cannot (a simpleton) or refuses (an honest man), is 
subject to ridicule. 
 
An interesting point of view about what influences 
illegal or criminal behaviour was presented by the Nobel 
Prize winner Becker in his research by means of 
economic analysis (1974, p. 43-47). To put it simply, 
according to him, a person is a rational thinking being 
and the decision whether or not a person will commit an 
unlawful act is affected by three factors: 
• the benefit which is acquired through the unlawful act, 
• the probability of being caught, 
• the expected sanction if the person gets caught. 
 
By comparing the first factor to the other two, the person 
rationally decides whether or not the unlawful act would 
pay off, which Becker explains by the model of choice; 
when a perpetrator or a potential perpetrator prefers the 
risk or when the risk is on the brink, the perpetrator 
considers whether the realistic profit from the criminal 
act is greater or lesser than what would otherwise be 
received through less legally risky activities. This 
condition of “optimality” is, according to Becker, the 
main principle in decision-making, and not, for instance, 
the effectiveness of the police or the court. To put it in 
short, it is about considering the possible positive and 
negative effects (costs and benefits) and not thinking 
about whether something is right or wrong. Although 
this is a simple model, it can easily apply to an individual 
illegal (as well as an immoral) act, therefore also to 
corruption (Šumah and Mahić, 2017, p. 250). Therefore, 
if we derive from this model, the legislation should make 
the benefit from corruption smaller than the potential 
negative consequences. This can, however, only be done 
through a change in legislation which must provide 
protection for those who care, increase sanctions, and 
enable the law enforcement authorities to act more 
effectively. 
 
One of the possible solutions for the reduction of 
corruption is offered by Ariely (2012, p. 181) and based 
on the “broken windows theory”, described in 1982 by 
George Kelling and James Wilson in an article in the 
Atlantic magazine. The article dealt with establishing of 
order in dangerous urban neighbourhoods. The authors 
did not see the solution in the increased police presence 
on the streets but rather elsewhere. They noticed that the 
broken windows in disorderly neighbourhoods (which 
remain unfixed for a long time) “are asking” for 
additional damage to the same building and others in the 
immediate surroundings by themselves. The vandalism 
consequently expands and intensifies. If there are no 
broken windows, the next vandals will not be 
encouraged. This theory is difficult to confirm or deny, 
but is logical according to Ariely, and he thus suggests 
that petty crimes (in this case, the occurrence of small 
corruption) should not be overlooked, excused or 
ignored, as this will only increase the problems. In his 
opinion the said applies especially to politicians, 
directors, public officials and celebrities. It is true that 
he wonders if it would be right to subject them to stricter 
standards than ordinary people, however, it is necessary 
to be aware that people who are more under the scrutiny 
of others have a greater influence on the behaviour of the 
observers (and followers) and the consequences for the 
society are bigger when they do something wrong. 
Therefore, the reaction to all phenomena of corruption, 
even the smallest ones, should be immediate and without 
mercy, for the only way to fight corruption is zero 
tolerance towards it. 
 
Directors, public officials, politicians and similar 
persons should be under even more scrutiny, both in 
terms of their actions and their financial situation. The 
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reversal of the burden of proof7 for the control of the 
property, which was introduced into the Slovenian law 
in 2011, should thus be used more frequently. If we want 
to deal with or limit corruption, one of the easiest and 
most effective ways is to take the unlawfully acquired 
property away from people, in which case it is not 
necessary to prove the blame of those who are suspected 
of corruption; it is them who must prove where their 
property is from, and if they not convincingly do that, 
they are stripped of their possessions. 
 
However, there is too little done in Slovenia with respect 
to prevention and education, for only if one gets people 
to become aware that we are all paying or are being 
deprived due to corruption (worse roads, more 
expensive healthcare, etc.), a critical mass with zero 
tolerance for corruption can be created, and only thus 
can success in the fight against corruption be guaranteed. 
 
CONCLUSION  
However, the main measures for preventing corruption 
are still more transparency, the establishment of 
mechanisms to reduce the risk of corruption and the 
coherence of governance with the legislation and ethics 
of both the state and state-owned enterprises, which can 
only be achieved with a sufficient number of adequately 
informed citizens. Precisely for this reason, two 
coordinated directions of action are needed in the fight 
against corruption; the first is through education and 
awareness of citizens provide a critical mass, which will 
have zero level of corruption tolerance and at the same 
time provide political will for changes. 
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